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IN THE SUPRE!'JE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD J. RICHARDSON, GROVEL. 
COOK and v<AYNE WEAVER, indiv-
idually and for and on behalf 
of all similarly situated share-
holders of Major Oil Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ARIZONA FUELS CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, EUGENE DALTON, 
an individual, DEANNA B. DALTON, 
an individual and ~1AJOR OIL 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS 
No. 15691 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Defendants-Appellants Arizona Fuels Corpor-
ation, Eugene Dalton, Deanna B. Dalton and ~iajor Oil 
Corporation (herein "defendants") respectfully object to 
Plaintiff-Respondents (herein "plaintiffs") Brief in that 
it substantially misstates the facts, misconstrues the 
issue and, hence, misinterprets the law. This Reply Brief 
will address itself exclusively to the most apparent of 
tnese misunderstandings. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
BARE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS VERIFIED ON INFORMATION 
AND BELIEF ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER. 
Defendants submit, although perhaps mis-
understood by plaintiffs, that a small dissatisfied 
minority cannot wrench control from the majority of a 
corporation based solely upon speculative and unfounded 
allegations and legal conclusions of misconduct. The law 
remains clear that a receiver can only be appointed based 
on admissible evidence; allegations in a verified com-
plaint made only upon information and belief clearly are 
not such evidence. State ex. rel Fatzer vs Molitor, 175 
Kan. 317, 263 P.2d 207 (1953); 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia 
Corporations, §7747; 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers §lll and 
112. 
Plaintiffs seek to circumvent the auth-
orities cited by defendants and audaciously allege that 
"Paragraphs 15, 16, 19, 22, 24, 26, 31, 34, 35, 36 and 46 
(R. 63, 64, 65, 66 and 68) set up significant claims of 
fraud, breach of fiduciary duties and conversion ... 
[Plaintiffs' Brief, P. 43] A review of the enumerated 
paragraphs reveals that each and every allegation con-
tained therein is made solely on information and belief. 
Plaintiffs' novel, but unsupported premise, appears to 
be that allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or 
- 2 -
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conversion need only be asserted on information and 
belief. The law is clearly otherwise as is set forth in 
Defendants' Brief at pages 5, 6, 7 and B. 
Plaintiffs' reliance upon Stevens vs South Ogden 
~~~~L-~~ll~l~~ and Emp. Co., 14 Utah 232, 47 Pac. 81 
(1896) is misplaced. Stevens involved an action for the 
appointment of a receiver for four related corporations. 
Defendants filed a general demurrer to the Complaint which 
the trial court sustained. The plaintiffs failed to amend 
their Complaint and the Court entered judgment dismissing 
the action. The issue on appeal was whether the Complaint 
stated a cause of action, not whether a receiver should 
have been appointed. The issues relating to the minimum 
evidentiary requirements necessary to support the appoint-
ment of a receiver were not before the Court. Stevens 
provides absolutely no assistance either by holding or by 
analogy in resolving the issues presently before this 
Court. 
The remaining allegations upon which plaintiffs 
rely are replete with unsupported legal conclusions 
founded upon allegations made on information and belief. 
A classic illustration is found in the Fifth Cause of 
Action of the Complaint and Amended Complaint. (R. 64, 
65) Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that the 
defendant Arizona Fuels filed a "spurious claim" against 
Major Oil in an Interpleader action pending in the United 
- 3 -
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States District Court for the District of Otah. (R. 64, 
para. 26) From the speculative premise that this claim 
was "spurious," plaintiffs arrive at the legal conclusion 
that the Onited States District Court's decision approving 
the claim should be appealed. (R. 65, para. 27 and 28) 
It is clear that every allegation of operative fact, 
opinion and conclusion contained in the Fifth Cause of 
Action is dependent upon the speculative premise that the 
claim filed by Arizona Fuels was "spurious." Such a 
conclusion clearly is neither evidence nor supported by 
the record. 
Plaintiffs' Tenth Cause of Action (R. 67, 
68) suffers from the same acute frailties discussed above. 
Paragraph 43 explicitly incorporates the information and 
belief allegat1ons made throughout the Amended Complaint. 
Paragraph 44 recites the theories and conclusions of eight 
prior causes of action for relief as the basis for an 
alternative claim founded upon fraud. Each and every 
allegation contained in Paragraph 44 is either explicitly 
or implicitly dependent upon allegations of operative 
fact made on information and belief and, as such, cannot 
conceivably support the appointment of a receiver. 
Plaintiffs additionally have totally failed 
to dentonstrate that the affiant, Wayne Weaver, is compe-
tent to testify as to the matters stated in the Complaint 
and Amended Complaint. Rule 56(e) of the Otah Rules of 
- 4 -
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Civil Procedure clearly requires that supporting affi-
davits shall "set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence and shall affirmatively show that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." An 
affidavit which reveals no evidentiary fact but merely 
reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and 
conclusions does not comply with the standards set forth 
in Rule 56(e). Walker vs Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 
29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). 
Neither the Verification, the Amended 
Complaint nor the Complaint reveals any facts which 
demonstrate that the affiant is competent to testify as to 
the allegations relied upon by plaintiffs to support the 
appointment of a receiver. The Verification for the 
Amended Complaint provides in its entirety: 
"Wayne Weaver, being first duly 
sworn, deposes and says that he is one 
of the plaintiffs in the foregoing 
action, that he has read the Amended 
Complaint and understands the con-
tents thereof and that the same 
is true of his own knowledge except as 
to matters therein stated on infor-
mation and belief, and as to such 
matters, he believes them to be 
true." (R. 72) 
This Verification clearly does not demonstrate sufficient 
evidentiary facts as required by Rule 56(e). 
Defendants submit that the appointment of a 
receiver for a corporation is not merely a routine func-
tion of the Court to be invoked by such generalized 
- 5 -
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allegations as are contained in plaintiffs' Complaint and 
Amended Complaint. Rather, it requires evidence of a 
reliable nature which does not exist in the present 
case. 
II. 
PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS RELATING TO THE CERTI-
FICATION OF A CLASS MISCONCEIVE THE PROCEDURAL 
POSTURE OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiffs appear to entirely misconceive 
the procedural posture of this case. The question before 
the Court arises on the plaintiffs' Motion for Class 
Certification under Rule 23(c)(l) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
---------------
Moreover, Rule 23(c)(l) explicitly 
requires the Court to determine: (a) whether this action 
should be permitted to proceed as a class action (and, if 
so, as what particular type of a class action) or (b) 
whether it should proceed as a shareholders' derivative 
action, if appropriate, or (c) whether it should proceed 
simply as an independent action by aggrieved individuals. 
The authorities are unanimous on the duties and respon-
sibilities of the Court when confronted with a Rule 
23(c)(l) motion of this sort: to determine (i) whether the 
action meets the criteria set forth for any class action 
in Rule 23(a), and, if so, (ii) under which category of 
class action set forth in Rule 23(b) the putative class 
action is properly classified. See: 7A Wright & ~liller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, §1785; 3B r1oore, ~1oore's 
Federal Practice, para. 23.50. 
- 6 -
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As against this procedural background, 
plaintiffs disingenuously argue that they have alleged "in 
the alternative," that their action is, at one and the 
same time, both a derivative suit and all three types of 
class action specified in Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs' Com-
plaint and Amended Complaint each contain allegations 
which at least cursorily evoke the entire gamut of class 
actions and derivative suits. Moreover, there can be no 
question but that Rule B(e) permits pleading in the 
alternative. Yet all of this simply belies the real 
issue. A Rule 23(c)(l) motion requires the Court to 
determine into which category of class actions, if any, 
the instant litigation falls. When the question before 
the Court is, as here, "under which of the four alter-
natives shall this action be classified," plaintiffs' 
response that "we have alleged all four" is something of a 
non sequitur. 
In this connection, it should be observed 
that the twelve "causes of action" set forth in the 
Complaint and Amended Complaint do not differentiate 
between class claims and derivative claims. Rather, four 
divergent theories of action are alleged largely by rote 
in the introductory seven paragraphs of the Complaint and 
Amended Complaint and, consequently, appear to apply with 
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Doubtlessly, a shareholder may possess 
individual claims and simultaneously assert corporate 
claims derivatively; however, this is not a case in which 
a shareholder is suing on certain individual claims and 
also on distinct corporate claims. Quite the contrary, in 
this case plaintiffs argue that each claim is "alter-
natively" all things to all men. As a matter of "notice 
pleading" this may be permissible but the issue presented 
for resolution on this motion is not "whether the Com-
plaint states a claim", but rather, "what claim the 
Complaint states." The answer to the former question is 
obviously not dispositive of the latter inquiry, and it is 
the latter inquiry only which is relevant here. 
The resolution of that relevant and pres-
sing issue--whether this is a class action at all and, if 
so, what kind--turns upon an analysis of the material 
facts as they appear from the pleadings. This cannot be 
gainsaid and is not disputed. Defendants have never 
contended that plaintiffs' Complaint was somehow insuf-
ficient on class certification issues, as distinguished 
from the questions conserning the appointment of a 
receiver, because the allegations of operable facts 
therein are asserted "on information and belief." Plain-
tiffs are railing at chimeras when they assume the con-
trary and berate for arguments which they never advanced. 
On the contrary, defendants' position is that, accepting 
- 8 -
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plaintiffs' allegations at face value, they still state 
exclusively ~Q££Q£~!~ claims, which the plaintiffs' 
may assert only derivatively, if at all. That is to say, 
even accepting all of the allegations of operable fact in 
the plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint as true, 
regardless of whether they are asserted on "information 
and belief" or on personal knowledge, the fact remains 
that they merely state corporate claims of Major Oil 
Corporation. 
On a Rule 23(c)(l) motion, an evaluation 
of the substance of the plaintiffs' claims is perforce 
necessary. Plaintiffs' conclusory classification of these 
claims by the largely verbatim recantation of the rubrics 
of all three types of class actions under Rule 23(b) and 
of shareholder derivative suits under Rule 23.1 in the 
prefactory paragraphs of the Complaint augurs ill or not 
at all for the reasoned disposition of the class certi-
fication motion. The precise question before the Court in 
this connection is one of substance and only tangen-
tially of procedure, much less of proper notice pleading. 
That plaintiffs can so blithely seek to rely on Rule 8(e) 
and Rule 11, while studiously avoiding the thrust of Rule 
23(c)(l) and Rule 23.1 altogether, is nothing short of 
incredible. 
In addition, the authorities cited by the 
plaintiffs are hardly dispositive of this issue. A 
- 9 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shareholder may have an individual claim against a cor-
poration for breach of an actual or implied contract with 
him, ~~·, the unlawful declaration of a dividend, or for 
a tortious act committed against him as in the failure to 
disclose material information to purchasers of its 
stock. Claims against third parties, including corporate 
insiders, who commit torts against the corporation or who 
breach contracts with the corporation, are nonetheless 
corporate causes of action and may be asserted by one or 
more of the shareholders only derivatively for and on 
behalf of the corporation. Plaintiffs would be well 
advised to review the quotation from the Advisory (0m-
mittee Note to Revised Rule 23, set forth at page 38 of 
their Brief and particularly the concluding parenthetical 
statement thereof, before castigating the defendants for 
their reliance upon the plain meaning of the relevant 
rules. 
Finally, the Rule 23(c) (1) determination of 
the nature of a class action has pervasive ramifications 
for the future conduct of the litigation. The incidents 
and effects of the various types of class actions differ 
depending upon the classification of Rule 23(b) into which 
they fall. Hence the leading commentators interpret the 
mandate of Rule 23(c)(l) to require classification of an 
action under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2) whenever pos-
sible, precisely because of the added res judicata effect 
- 10 -
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accorded to the class opponent and the more efficacious 
and expeditious procedures enjoyed by both parties and the 
Court: 
"If the court finds that a class action 
could be maintained under (b){3), as 
well as under {b)(l) and/or {b)(2), 
the court should order that it be 
maintained as a (b)(l) and/or (b)(2) 
suit so that the members of the class 
may not opt out as they would have a 
right to do if the action were main-
tained as a (b)(3) class action." 3B 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, para. 
23.50. 
Even assuming arguendo that the allegations 
set forth in the plaintiffs' Complaint may be properly 
characterized as falling within the purview of both Rule 
23(b)(l) and 23(b){3), this action should be certified to 
proceed only under Rule 23(b){l), thereby assuring the 
defendants of the final and binding adjudication to which 
they are entitled. In this connection, plaintiffs seem to 
argue for some sort of "nondecision decision." Initially, 
they moved the Lower Court for an order the precise 
purpose of which was to determine whether the action 
should proceed as a class action or not, and, in response 
to defendants' arguments that the action was not properly 
classified as such, they then curiously and somewhat 
inconsistently revert to the position that it is, after 
all, alleged to be both and, therefore, the Court need 
not, and indeed could not, decide the very question which 
- 11 -
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ultimately constitutes quintessence of their motion! 
While accusing defendants of being didactic in attempting 
to analyze the substance of their allegations, plaintiffs 
have the temerity to implicitly but completely eviscerate 
Rule 23.1 without even addressing themselves to the 
purpose or even to the separate existence of this most 
apposite rule. 
Defendants respectfully submit that the 
Lower Court erred certifying this action as a class action 
when the only claims asserted by plaintiffs are corporate 
claims of Major Oil Corporation. This error is compli-
cated by the fact that this action was certified as a 
class action under both Rule 23(b) ( 1) and 23(b) (3), which 
precludes tr.e res judicata effect of any judgment entered. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 1979. 
/: // /' /~' 
LeRO S. AXLAND, Esq. 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. 
of and for 
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